Hi Bruce,
If you did, I don't see how you can consider it sidetracking. I confronted what you wrote directly and literally.
"You may think this is about formalisms"
Yes, I do. I consider Dick's work in chapter 1 to be a formal mathematical theorem. The remaining chapters show how the theorem can be applied to various questions about phenomenal reality.
"...you don't understand or won't explain where reality differs from bananas in the sense that both can be seen as "a set of numbers"
"
I'm having trouble parsing your sentence. You mention a difference but go on to say that the sense of that difference is that they both share an attribute.
What is it that you would like me to understand/explain? The difference between reality and bananas? or the fact that both can be seen as "a set of numbers'?
Instead of waiting for your answers, I'll interpret it both ways, and demonstrate to you that I understand by giving you an explanation for each.
The difference between bananas and reality is that the former is a proper subset of the latter.
They can both be "seen" as "a set of numbers" because however you define 'seen', it will involve some aspects of the bananas/reality to enter our consciousness as some sort of image. To show that they "can be seen" simply means that I need to show some method of seeing them as sets of numbers. That is fairly easy. A digital photo of bananas, or a picture of Europa delivered to us by the Galileo spacecraft can be seen as a set of numbers if you look at the raw data.
So, what do you think? Do I understand "where reality differs from bananas in the sense that both can be seen as "a set of numbers""? If not, would you do me the favor of explaining it to me?
"All I'm saying is that he is a quack, period. And I challenge you to prove me wrong on that."
I am not interested in responding to a challenge to defend against an ad hominem attack.
Warm regards,
Paul |