>>>First, you do not comment at all on most of what I put in the post. I am not sure how I am supposed to interpret that. Do you understand what I was saying or have you just decided to ignore it?"There is a subtle aspect to science unrealized by many scientists. When one designs an experiment, one must be careful to assure that the result is not predetermined by definition: that is, that one is actually checking something of significance. A simple example of what I am talking about could be an experiment to determine if water runs downhill. If one defines downhill via a carpenters level, one has clearly predefined the result of the experiment: downhill has been defined to be the direction water runs (the bubble being the absence of water). It is rather a waste of time to carry out such an experiment unless you clearly realize that you are merely checking the consistency of your definitions." In the above example, water runs downhill by definition: i.e., downhill is explicitly defined to be the direction water runs (in the bubble on the level). The outcome of an experiment is fixed by the definition: if one sets the level so that the water in the level runs in a particular direction then water runs in that direction.>>I *define* an *observation* to be a subset of the above set. (Some set of "undefined" facts that I am aware of; their names will have to wait until I can conceive of an explanation.)>>I *define* *knowable data* to be that set of facts which are "real". (This is, as opposed to the set of facts I am going to make up out of whole cloth to complete my "explanation".) As an electron is a made up concept to explain the phenomena observed. You should think about that for a while.>I *define* *unknowable data* to be that set of facts which I imagine (make up - dream up out of my own head with no need to be real at all, just part of the story "how the tiger got its stripes") Just as "electrons" explain a lot of phenomena. (Or, at one time, how phlogiston explained a lot of phenomena.) The only constraint on the unknowable stuff is that it must obey exactly the same rules obeyed by the real stuff. (That is, if and when I ever get to that explanation I intend to look for!)>I also point out that the absolute best I can ever hope to do is predict the probability of seeing something based on what I have to work with. No matter how much I have to work with, it is always possible that I will end up with a result I have never seen before.>In Chapter 2, in my attempt to solve the fundamental equation, I show that, if you *define* m, c and V(x) (which in the "Stafford Reality" are not yet defined at all - they are no more than terms in a specific approximation to the fundamental equation - see equation 2.16), Schrodinger's equation turns out to be an approximation to my fundamental equation. This identification leads directly to a specific definition of mass, momentum, energy and their respective "expectation" values: m, P and E. In my attack, these terms are defined once and only once with no predefined relationships so these definitions place no constraint what so ever on what will really be seen (if and when I ever do go to propose an explanation of it all).