I've had posts rejected in "God and Science". The trick seems to be that they must strictly be about "God and Science" with no slams to another poster. Also, I suspect that John might have another moderator, but that's a guess (and, 'no' to those who might think I am moderating...).
If we do get cut off, I'll meet you at ephilosopher.com (metaphysics and epistemology sub-forum).
It is pretty straight forward logic and only involves simple mathematics which should be clear to anyone who has had high school calculus. Any clarification you need I would be happy to provide. What I would really like to discuss would be the philosophical consequences which would flow from an admission of the validity of my statement.
Congrats on some presentation improvements on your part. It is much tighter and not as prone to misinterpretation and skepticism, at least with the first page as presented.
But, as you must know, I have never spent much time doubting your math. What I have always doubted is the application of your math. It contains certain misconceptions of philosophy that are apparent anytime you attempt to equate your math terms to philosophical terms. Here is a significant fallacy in your reasoning:
set A is problematical for applying to reality.
(1) if set A only represents reality, then the representation is also a subset of set C (since set C is equivalent to an explanation of reality by implied definition), in which case your set logic is flawed since if set A is a subset of set C then set C cannot be a subset of set A.
(2) if set A is reality, then you have erred by suggesting an equivalence relationship with what cannot be known. For example, we have no way of knowing with any certainty if sets are valid concepts with regard to reality. Perhaps the world is not made of discrete things. Imagine this in a one-dimensional world where 'people' exist on a line. The line can be sub-divided as dots (elements), however the theory of their world as composed of discrete dots might not be correct. It might just as well be that the dots are approximations based on their limited experience of the continuous line. A set without elements is an undefined set, and labelling it a set is just words, it means nothing in terms of set B or set C. Now, it is true that the ontological status of set A is inconsequential as to the epistemological limitations of set B or set C, but your key assumption is based on:
"An algorithm which will yield the probability of any specific set B derived from A which is consistent with the distribution of B in C (so that the explanation may yield expectations: i.e., so that it will be an acceptable explanation of A consistent with C)."
Notice that if set A is completely undefinable, then you cannot derive a probability of any specific set B derived from A since the assumption of being derived from A is ill-founded. Set B might be derived from the human perspective of set A, however then you are basing your probability based on the human perspective which must take into account human perception and human cognition - which the science of each is vastly incomplete to form any probability matrices as to what a human is likely to perceive of undefined set A considering their environment, personal history, beliefs, etc.
Hence, you can relish the math as a theorem (assuming the math is correct), but applying it to philosophy is a vipers pit.