***" The question is does a concept of absolute truth approach any absolute truth of the universe that may regulate the fundamental structures of the universe. Truth is a fundamental attribute (or byproduct) of any sentence in English, but this reference to 'truth' may not equate to an absolute truth of the universe. " It does not and it cannot. As I said, the universe doesn't speak English or any other language; the concept 'truth' has nothing to do with what happens in reality. But the fact that there exists a high degree of isomorphism between our linguistic descriptions of reality and reality itself is, to me, nothing short of a miracle.***
Well, I'm not exactly sure then what you protested against in my original post. What you just said is my main point. There are high degree of isomorphisms between the world and theory, but our best theories have shown to constantly breakdown at some point in comparing the two structures (i.e., theory and observations of reality). Perhaps you disagree that this apparent isomorphism can potentially be accounted for under a different scheme than some kind of logic/math are 'the rules of reality' scheme (i.e., neo-logicism)?
***The only possible objection to that stance is a simple one: it doesn't apply to itself. The logical positivists have a concept of truth that fails their own criteria for truth. Yes, I acknowledge it's a problem, but nobody has come up with anything better and more solid so far.***
I disagree, but no account is perfect and probably will never be.
***" I think the concept of absolute truth is important to anyone. The open question is how do we treat statements that pretend to be fully undeniable in every possible situation imaginable? " Simple: build your personal philosophy around them.***
What I have in mind is to treat such fully undeniable statements as myth. Having degrees of truth, but not deluded into thinking that fully undeniable statements must always be the case (i.e., I'm talking about external statements about the metaphysical structure of the world and not tautologies).
My position is best stated by an analogy. In most instances it is correct and proper to say that 'chairs exist', but such fully undeniable statements about external statements of the world are deniable in some instances (e.g., if we reject that large objects actually exist, for example). But, it is very meaningful to me to say that 'chairs exist', so I continue to use such statements. I feel the same way about this particular philosophy. It may not be 100% correct about the world given a particular situation. For example, maybe it is proper to say that there quarks because they actually do exist, but it is not meaningful for me to go that route since I do not have a way to absolutely know that there are actually quarks that exist. Hence, I stick with the philosophy that is most meaningful, which happens to be this one - that we choose beliefs that 'fit' our idea of what is meaningful based on interaction with nature.