Harvey: "If an explanation is not grounded on the observation of 'physical things', then what separates a religious astral explanation from that of scientific explanation of some physical phenomenon?

Dick: Nothing. That is, nothing except for differences in complexity of the predicted consequences: in other words, the predictive value of the perspective. My model of an explanation can model any explanation of anything. The procedure for fabricating the model is exactly specified.

Question 7: If complexity of the predicted consequences (or predictive value of the perspective) is what separates a scientific explanation from a religious explanation, then what property of an explanation decides what becomes "known information" if, as you say, an explanation is "a method of obtaining expectations from given known information"? In other words, why should we accept something as "known information", and if we cannot, then how can you say that your definition of an explanation is valid?

• Known information is what the explainer provides! - doctordick - December 5, 2004 - 02:26 UTC