Well, you seem to be back in all your glory; however, once again you seem to have missed the central issue of what I said: "It is possible to label all of these "things" with numbers." You immediately step off in a direction describing particular methods of accomplishing this numbering and what implications follow from your numbering technique. I have no argument with any of that at all; my point was very simple "it is possible to label all of these 'things'" and I have no interest in how that numbering is to be accomplished or what the implications of any particular algorithm are! If you are going to argue with me, it seems to me that it is incumbent upon you to at least give an example of something which cannot be referred to (certainly, if it can be referred to, the reference itself can be used as a label and converting that reference into a number is a trivial issue).
If you stop to think about it, you should comprehend that, even if it takes you a thousand (or even a thousand billion) pages of text to explain exactly what kind of circumstance will yield a "thing" which may exist and cannot be labeled, I could simply transform that text into a binary representation which can easily be interpreted as a number and the thing being discussed has been labeled with a number. I have utterly no interest is what this particular "thing" is, my interest is only in the fact that it can be labeled.
It is very important to my presentation that no limitations be imposed concerning how that numbering is to be accomplished; absolutely all possibilities must be held open! The only thing which is important is that labeling with a number is possible.
Harv: But, how can you know that (P-6) is true. That appears to me to be a problem.
Getting directly to your "problem". Let us suppose that there exists some "thing" which cannot be referred to. Explain to me exactly how the "causal tie-in" is accomplished (which you yourself have required in your definition of "exists") without any means of reference to that "thing". Is not the "causal tie-in" itself a reference?
It appears to me that your response betrays a fear of committing to the idea that "things" that exist or are thought to exist can be referred to! That is a rather extreme position to take up and, in my mind, would only be taken up as a last ditch defense to an unreasonable position.
Harv: Without this algorithm, the term 3 oranges would be meaningless.
The "things which make up Ultimate Reality" are certainly meaningless if "Ultimate Reality" is not understood! The whole idea of "meaning" implies understanding of some sort. You need to accept this if you want to think logically about things you do not understand. "Understanding" these things is far down the line from what I want to talk about. How can one understand something one cannot refer to? My point should be clear to you; I hold that I can refer to things which I do not understand. If you contend that you cannot refer to anything which you don't understand, you are implicitly implying that you understand things: i.e., that your understanding is correct, a jump of faith that I say you have no logical method of defending.
Have fun -- Dick