>>>H: ”There isn't a complete philosophical account of science as a superior epistemological enterprise…” L: Right, and there isn’t a Klingon version of the King James Bible. However, I don’t think Biblical scholars are too concerned.>H: ”(‘Satisfying’ and ‘complete’) don't mean the same thing and I'm afraid that something being complete is much more of a demanding requirement than something satisfying certain conditions.” L: In other words, the conclusions of a discipline are ‘satisfying’ if they conform to the methodology and metrics of the discipline within which they are drawn. But, as you say, so what? If this is your definition of satisfying, then numerology is just as satisfying as science, philosophy, and religion.>H: ”My exact position is that antirealism fails in particular areas where realism does not.” L: Simply put, antirealism fails to ascribe metaphysical meaning to assumptions. Therefore, you and I define failure in drastically different ways: I define failure as soliciting an unsolicited claim that inductivist deductions (a.k.a. assumptions) are ‘real’ (or ‘real enough’); you define failure as the tendency to hold agnosticism as a philosophical foundation.>(In fact, since we’re apparently free to tell each other what we ‘must’ do, you *must* explain why it is not okay to be agnostic about assumptions.)>>L: Neither antirealism nor realism can offer a complete account of science and mathematics as we experience them. It is illogical to complain about a philosophy’s incompleteness from the position of an equally incomplete philosophy. H: ”...This amounts to extreme skepticism but it itself is not justifiable.” L: A questionable assertion. In fact, you *must* justify this statement.